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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
JOHN H. SCHMIDT, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 930793-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from conditional pleas of guilty to one 
count of unlawful possession of a controlled substance (cocaine), 
a third degree felony, and one count of unlawful possession of a 
controlled substance (marijuana), a class A misdemeanor, both in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2) (1990). This Court has 
jurisdiction to hear the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2) (f) (1992) . 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court correctly determine that the search 
warrant affidavit contained a sufficient factual basis to support 
the issuance of a day or night warrant? 
The search warrant affidavit should be found invalid "only if 
the magistrate, given the totality of the circumstances, lacked a 
'substantial basis'" for determining that the facts were sufficient 
to support the warrant. Great deference should be given to the 
magistrate's determination. Cf. State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 
1260 (Utah 1993) (citing State v. Babbell, 770 P.2d 987, 991 (Utah 
1989) . 
2. If the factual basis for a day or night warrant was 
insufficient, did the trial court nonetheless properly refuse to 
order suppression as the appropriate remedy for the statutory 
violation? 
This issue presents a question of law, reviewed on appeal 
under a correction of error standard. State v. Rowe, 850 P. 2d 427, 
430 (Utah 1992); State v. Simmons, 866 P.2d 614, 616 (Utah App. 
1993) . 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Annotated, section 77-23-5(1) (1990), provides in 
pertinent part: 
The magistrate must insert a direction in the 
warrant that it be served in the daytime, 
unless the affidavits or oral testimony state 
a reasonable cause to believe a search is 
necessary in the night to seize the property 
prior to it being concealed, destroyed, 
damaged or altered, or for other good reason; 
in which case he may insert a direction that 
it be served any time of the day or night. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
After a hearing in which the trial court denied his motion to 
suppress, defendant entered into a plea bargain, presumably 
pursuant to State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988) (R. 64-
65) .x He was thereafter convicted of one count of possession of 
1
 The conditional nature of the plea is attested to in 
defendant's statement in advance of plea of guilty (R. 64-65). At 
no point in the record is Sery referenced. 
2 
a controlled substance (cocaine), a third degree felony, and one 
count of possession of a controlled substance (marijuana), a class 
A misdemeanor. The court sentenced defendant to zero to five years 
in the Utah State Prison for the felony offense and one year in 
jail for the misdemeanor, to run concurrently with the prison term 
(R. 72) . Defendant filed a timely appeal (R. 74) , which this Court 
subsequently dismissed for failure to file a brief (R. 110). 
According to defendant's docketing statement, defendant 
subsequently "filed for a writ of Habeas Corpus which was granted 
by the District Court allowing him to be resentenced" (See Addendum 
A at 2) .2 Following the resentencing, defendant's current attorney 
filed this timely appeal (R. 119, 120). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The parties do not dispute the facts (R. 84) .3 On the evening 
of December 8, 1990, the Weber Morgan Narcotics Strike Force 
executed a no-knock, day or night search warrant on a third-party 
residence in Ogden, Utah (R. 30) .4 Defendant was at the residence, 
was searched pursuant to the warrant, and was found in possession 
of both cocaine and marijuana (R. 98) . He was arrested and charged 
2
 Defendant's docketing statement provides the only 
indication of what occurred procedurally at this juncture. 
3
 The parties below apparently stipulated to the facts, 
although only the bare outline of what happened in the course of 
the search is evident from the record (R. 84, 98) . 
4
 The record does not indicate when the search was conducted. 
However, the State is aware, based on conversations with the trial 
prosecutor, that the search was conducted at night. Compare State 
v. White, 851 P.2d 1195 (Utah App. 1993) (propriety of nighttime 
authority not addressed where day or night search was conducted 
during daytime hours). 
3 
with two felony counts of possession of a controlled substance with 
intent to distribute (R. 1-2). 
Defendant moved to suppress the search warrant primarily on 
the ground that the "search warrant authorizing a night time search 
was insufficient under the criteria pronounced in State v. Rowe, 
154 Utah. Adv. Rep. 12 (Feb. 8, 1991)" (R. 27). In essence, he 
argued that the affidavit and search warrant did not contain 
sufficient particularized facts to justify a nighttime search (R. 
85-86) . Following a suppression hearing, the trial court denied 
the motion, stating that while the language of the affidavit 
supporting the warrant was "somewhat conclusory," it nonetheless 
contained sufficient information on its face to justify both the 
no-knock and nighttime provisions of the warrant (R. 100-102) . 
Defendant then entered into a plea agreement with the State, 
resulting in his conditional guilty pleas. The trial court 
sentenced him, and this appeal eventually resulted (R. 72, 120).5 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant argues that the search warrant affidavit did not 
contain sufficient facts to support a nighttime search under Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-23-5(1) (1990) . Defendant cites to one paragraph in 
the affidavit to support this assertion. Taken as a whole, 
however, the affidavit established that an ongoing drug business 
was being operated out of the residence identified on the warrant. 
The inherent dangerousness of continuing drug enterprises and their 
5
 The procedural history of this appeal, not directly 
relevant to its substance, is outlined in the statement of the 
case. 
4 
relationship with weapons use has been well recognized. Under the 
circumstances, statutory "good cause" for the nighttime search 
existed, and the trial court's decision to authorize a nighttime 
entry was substantially supported by the evidence. 
Even if this Court determines that a statutory violation 
occurred, suppression of the evidence is not the proper remedy. 
Defendant has not asserted a violation of his constitutional 
rights. A procedural violation of a statute may give rise to 
suppression as a remedy, but only if defendant demonstrates either 
that the violation prejudiced him or that the police officers 
executing the search warrant acted in bad faith. Because defendant 
has not made such a showing, suppression is not a proper remedy. 
Therefore, this Court should affirm the trial court's decision to 
deny defendant's motion to suppress. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT THE 
SEARCH WARRANT AFFIDAVIT CONTAINED A 
SUFFICIENT FACTUAL BASIS TO SUPPORT THE 
ISSUANCE OF A DAY OR NIGHT WARRANT. 
Defendant's sole argument on appeal is that the magistrate who 
signed the search warrant did not have before him sufficient, 
particularized factual evidence to satisfy the requirements of Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-23-5(1) (1990). This provision allows the 
magistrate who issues the warrant to insert permission for a day or 
night search if the affidavits or oral testimony state a 
"reasonable cause to believe a search is necessary in the night to 
seize the property prior to it being concealed, destroyed, damaged 
5 
or altered" or "other good reason" for the nighttime search. 
Defendant's analysis focuses on the single paragraph in the 
four-page affidavit that specifically addresses nighttime service: 
Your Affiant prays for a night time service as 
well as no-knock service of the warrant. Your 
Affiant knows from experience and training 
that more and more narcotics dealers are 
arming themselves for protection against one 
another as well as from narcotics users. Your 
Affiant has been on numerous narcotic search 
warrants where firearms are available to 
suspects inside the premises. Further, your 
Affiant believes it is safer for the officers 
serving the warrant as well as non-
participants to the narcotic sales, if the 
officers have the cover of darkness as well as 
no-knock service. 
Addendum B or R. 41. Defendant argues that this language fails to 
include any facts specific to his case and that, in any event, no 
record evidence was ever adduced to support the affiant's concern 
about weapons. Therefore, under the standard enunciated by this 
Court in State v. Rowe, the affidavit fails to provide sufficient 
justification for a nighttime search warrant (R. 8-9). State v. 
Rowe, 606 P.2d 730 (Utah App. 1991) (Rowe I), rev'd in part, 850 
P.2d 427 (Utah 1992) (Rowe II). 
The State does not dispute defendant's assertion that this 
single paragraph, standing alone, would furnish an insufficient 
factual basis for issuance of a day or night warrant. See State v. 
Simmons, 866 P.2d 614, 616 (Utah App. 1993) (identical language 
"lacked sufficient factual specificity to authorize nighttime 
6 
entry").6 Merely checking off appropriate boxes on a preprinted 
affidavit form will not meet the requirement for a particularized 
showing of facts. Rowe 1, 606 P. 2d at 733-34. Similarly, 
recitation of standard boilerplate language should not in and of 
itself support the issuance of such a warrant. 
The search warrant affidavit, however, must be read as a whole 
to ascertain its full meaning. See State v. Rosenbaum, 845 P.2d 
962, 965 (Utah App. 1993) . A close examination of the entire 
document reveals the particularized factual basis for the day or 
night warrant, supporting both the magistrate's issuance of the 
warrant and, subsequently, the trial court's denial of defendant's 
motion to suppress. 
The warrant focused on 146 Harrison Boulevard, five named 
individuals as well as "all persons on the premises," and six 
particular vehicles. The affidavit supporting the warrant included 
information from two confidential informants and from the affiant, 
an experienced police officer and narcotics investigator (Addendum 
B or R. 39-42) . 
The first informant reported that Pat Barnes, residing at 14 6 
Harrison Boulevard, had been selling "pound quantities of 
6
 The Simmons affidavit contained one additional paragraph, 
which stated: "Your affiant believes there is a quantity of 
marijuana at the residence in Willard, Utah at this time and that 
to delay would afford the residents ample time to sell, destroy, or 
move the marijuana. Due to the late hour of the day your affiant 
requests that the warrant be issued for day or night time service." 
Simmons, 866 P.2d at 615. Because the affidavit did not contain 
additional specific facts to support the nighttime warrant, the 
State conceded that the affidavit lacked sufficient factual 
specificity to authorize nighttime entry under Rowe I. 
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marijuana." During an ensuing investigation, Pat Barnes was 
observed entering the home of two people to whom he sold the pound 
quantities and then leaving a short time later. The two 
individuals were subsequently arrested and convicted on possession 
of marijuana and drug paraphernalia charges (R. 40). 
The second confidential informant participated in a controlled 
marijuana buy at the Harrison Boulevard residence. This informant 
observed marijuana, scales, and money inside a safe in the Barnes' 
bedroom closet. The informant also reported that three other 
people living at the residence were selling marijuana supplied by 
Pat Barnes. The informant participated in controlled drug buys 
from each of them (R. 40). 
The affiant reported his own participation in the 
investigation and his observations of drugs being transported in 
six identified vehicles associated with the Barnes' residence. He 
then attested to his fifteen years as a police officer, including 
extensive narcotics training and experience in both investigations 
and undercover drug purchases. The general language addressing the 
relationship between narcotics dealers and firearms then followed 
(R. 41). 
Taken as a whole, the affidavit established that an ongoing 
drug business was being operated out of 146 Harrison Boulevard. 
The affidavit included specific facts from two reliable 
confidential informants and the investigating officer, all of which 
documented the continuing nature of the enterprise. The narcotics 
investigator bolstered these specific facts with his opinion, based 
8 
on his extensive training and experience, that narcotics dealers 
pose a threat to anyone interfering with their activities. 
The inherent dangerousness of on-going drug businesses and 
their relationship with weapons use is well recognized. See, e.g. , 
State v. Dorsev, 731 P.2d 1085, 1092 (Utah 1986) (Zimmerman, J., 
concurring in result) (reasonable assumption that those moving 
large quantities of illegal drugs over distances might be armed and 
dangerous); State v. White, 856 P.2d 656, 664 (Utah App. 1993) 
(citing LaFave for the proposition that "dealing in large 
quantities of narcotics" may be categorized as an "inherently 
dangerous" offense); United States v. Parrish, 925 F.2d 1293, 1298 
(10th Cir. 1991) (guns facilitate illegal drug activities because 
dealers use them to protect themselves, their drugs, and their 
money); United States v. Trullo, 809 F.2d 108, 113 (1st Cir. 1987) 
(drug dealing described as "a pattern of criminal activity rife 
with deadly weapons"); United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 62 (2d 
Cir. 1977) (firearms are "tools of the trade" to substantial drug 
dealers) (citation omitted). 
Based on the affidavit, the magistrate issued a day or night 
search warrant. At the suppression hearing, in reviewing the 
sufficiency of the affidavit, the trial court focused on the 
affiant's experience and on his opinion that the danger for people 
both in the home and in the neighborhood would be minimized if the 
search could be executed at night (R. 101-02). The court noted 
that while the affidavit contained conclusory language, it also 
recited sufficient facts to meet the statutory requirement. While 
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the trial court focused on the boilerplate language of the 
affidavit rather than on the document as a whole, this Court may 
affirm on any reasonable ground. State v. Gray, 717 P. 2d 1313, 
1316 (Utah 1986) . 
A reading of the affidavit as a whole, particularly the 
specific facts attesting to an ongoing narcotics business operating 
out of the home, provides the statutory "good reason" necessary to 
justify the nighttime search. See State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 
1260 (Utah 1993) (reviewing court should consider search warrant in 
its entirety and in a common sense fashion). Because the decision 
of the trial court was not clearly erroneous, this Court should 
defer to the trial court's determination and affirm the denial of 
defendant's motion to suppress. 
POINT TWO 
EVEN IF THIS COURT DETERMINES THAT THE FACTUAL 
SUPPORT FOR THE WARRANT WAS STATUTORILY 
INSUFFICIENT, IT SHOULD NONETHELESS AFFIRM THE 
TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS BECAUSE THE VIOLATION WAS PROCEDURAL 
AND DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO SHOW HOW THE 
VIOLATION PREJUDICED HIM OR THAT THE POLICE 
OFFICERS ACTED IN BAD FAITH. 
Even if this Court determines that the magistrate and trial 
court improperly found sufficient factual support for the warrant, 
it should still affirm the trial court's decision to deny the 
suppression motion. Defendant's assumption that suppression is the 
appropriate remedy if a statutory violation occurred ignores the 
Supreme Court's ruling in Rowe II. 
In Rowe II, the Utah Supreme Court adopted language developed 
in an earlier case, State v. Fixel, in which an officer clearly 
10 
acted outside his statutory geographical authority in an undercover 
drug buy. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court concluded that 
suppression of the resulting evidence would be "a remedy out of all 
proportion to the benefits gained to the end of obtaining justice 
while preserving individual liberties unimpaired." Fixel, 744 P. 2d 
1366, 1369 (Utah 1987) (citations omitted) . This holding was based 
on a recognition that: 
[o]nly a 'fundamental violation of a rule 
of criminal procedure requires automatic 
suppression, and a violation is 'fundamental' 
only where it, in effect, renders the search 
unconstitutional under traditional fourth 
amendment standards. Where the alleged 
violation . . . is not 'fundamental' 
suppression is required only where: 
(1) there was 'prejudice' in the sense 
that the search might not have occurred or 
would not have been so abrasive if the rule 
had been followed, or (2) there is evidence of 
intentional and deliberate disregard of a 
provision of the rule. 
It is only where the violation also 
implicated fundamental, constitutional 
concerns, is conducted in bad-faith or has 
substantially prejudiced the defendant that 
exclusion may be an appropriate remedy. 
Id. at 1368-69 (quoting Commonwealth v. Mason, 507 Pa. 396, 490 
A.2d 421 (1985)) (emphasis in original). 
In this case, defendant has not alleged any violation of his 
constitutional rights. He does not challenge the affidavit for 
lack of probable cause, nor does he claim that the search of his 
person, pursuant to the "all persons on the premises" language in 
the affidavit, was improper. He asserts only that the nighttime 
authorization did not comply with the relevant statutory mandate 
(Br. of App. at 8-9) . As such, he is at most asserting 
11 
noncompliance with a statutory procedural provision. This is an 
assertion that, even if correct, does not require suppression as a 
remedy. Indeed, as the Utah Supreme Court has observed, "The 
majority of courts that have examined the issue have determined 
that procedural violations in the execution of search warrants do 
not require suppression of the evidence seized." Rowe II, 850 P.2d 
at 429. See also United States v. Schoenheit, 856 F.2d 74, 76-77 
(8th Cir. 1988) (noncompliance with nighttime authorization 
prerequisites does not automatically require suppression of 
evidence); United States v. Searp, 586 F.2d 1117, 1125 (6th Cir. 
1978), cert, denied, 440 U.S. 921 (1979) (violation of nighttime 
provision is procedural and does not require suppression; cited 
with approval in Fixel and Rowe II) ; United States v. Shelton, 742 
F. Supp. 1491, 1502-03 (D. Wyo. 1990) (violation of nighttime 
search provision is statutory and does not require suppression; 
citing Fixel as in accord); People v. Dvla, 536 N.Y.S. 799, 808-
09, 142 A.D.2d 423 (N.Y. App 1988) (distinct trend is towards 
recognizing that violation of procedural rule does not implicate 
fourth amendment rights and, therefore, that suppression is not 
appropriate); State v. Brock, 294 Or. 15, 653 P.2d 543, 547 (1982) 
(suppression not required for violation of nighttime search 
provisions); Commonwealth v. Musi, 486 Pa. 102, 404 A.2d 378, 384-
85 (1979) (suppression not required for violation of procedural 
rules governing execution and return on search warrant). 
A procedural violation of a statute may give rise to 
suppression as a remedy only if defendant demonstrates either that 
12 
the violation prejudiced him or that the police officers executing 
the search warrant did not act in good faith. Rowe 11, 850 P. 2d at 
429 (quoting State v. Fixel, 744 P.2d at 1369 (citation omitted)). 
The burden is squarely on defendant to make such a showing. Rowe 
II, 850 P.2d at 430. "In order to show prejudice, defendant must 
establish that absent the nighttime entry, 'the search would not 
otherwise have occurred or would not have been so abrasive if the 
Rule had been followed.'" Id. (citation omitted). See also Utah 
R. Crim. P. 3 0 (error not affecting the substantial rights of a 
party shall be disregarded) . Defendant has made no attempt at such 
a showing. Similarly, he has failed to carry his burden of 
demonstrating any bad faith by the officers conducting the search. 
For these reasons, even if this Court finds that the factual 
showing to support the day or night warrant was insufficient, 
suppression of the evidence is not a proper remedy. This Court 
should, therefore, affirm the trial court's decision to deny 
defendant's motion to suppress. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, this court should affirm defendant's 
conviction. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 3/ day of May, 1994. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
JOANNE C. SLOTNIK 
Assistant Attorney General 
^to***£ 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of the 
foregoing brief of Appellee were mailed first class, postage 
prepaid, to John T. Caine, Attorney for Defendant, Public Defender 
Association, 2568 Washington Boulevard, Ogden, Utah 84401, this 
day of May, 1994. 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
JOHN T. CAINE #0536 of 
WEBER COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER'S ASSOCIATION 
Attorney for Defendant • nn 1 fl 01 
2568 Washington Boulevard j ra • 0 W 
Ogden, Utah 84401 f 
Telephone: (801) 392-8247 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : DOCKETING STATEMENT 
vs. : 
JOHN SCHMIDT, : Case No. 930793-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JVPJSPICTION 
Jurisdiction to hear the above entitled appeal is conferred 
upon the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 78-2(a)-3(h). 
NATUfig QF PfiQCPEDTNgg 
This is an appeal from a Judgment and conviction in the above 
entitled matter on the charge of Possession of a Controlled 
Substance, a Third Degree Felony, from a plea of guilty in the 
Second Judicial District Court of Weber County. 
PATE OF pgCISION AFP PROCEPUEAL PXSTORY 
The Defendant was convicted and sentenced for the crime of 
Possession of a Controlled Substance, Third Degree Felony 
following a plea of guilty on November 8, 1993 and an appeal from 
that decision was filed on December 8, 1993. 
ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether or not the District Court erred in failing to 
1 
suppress a search of a residence in which the Defendant was not a 
resident, but only visiting the home at the time, thus allowing 
evidence of possession to potentially be introduced into Court. 
The Defendant, upon the failure to suppress, then entered a plea 
of guilty upon the advice of his attorney. 
STATUTES. RULES OR CASES 
No specific statutes involved and the cases to be discussed 
are those generally utilized by this Court in evaluating the 
evidence presented at a Trial in a criminal case pursuant to the 
Fourth Amendment prohibitions against unreasonable search and 
seizures. 
PRIOR APPEALS 
There has been a prior appeal in this case. The appeal was 
dismissed for failure to timely file a Brief. The Defendant filed 
a Writ of Habeas Corpus which was granted by the District Court 
allowing him to be resentenced. The Defendant was paroled from 
the Utah State Prison and was resentenced on November 8, 1993 to 
allow him to pursue this appeal. This Court has not made a 
decision on the merits. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 27JA?day q£ Dfcembex^ 199' 
CAI1 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the above and foregoing Docketing Statement to the Plaintiff, 
Weber County Attorney's Office, 2J5£9Washington Boulevard, 7 th 
Floor, Ogden, Utah 84401, pc^t^ge^^ep^id this 27th day of 
December, 1993. ( ( j ) y^) 
LC4\<^ 
PAM PONTIUS, Secretary 
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ADDENDUM B 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
The undersigned being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
That the affiant has reason to believe that: HAY 0 2 1991 
(X) On the person (s) of: I IIQ 00ti§ 
1— PATRICK O. BARNES ' 
2 — RAELENE BARNES 
3— LUANNE 0RVIS 
4— BRETT TH0XA8 
5— TAKI VAROO 
6— ALL PERSONS ON THE PREMISES OF 146 HARRISON BLVD. (basement 
apartment) 
(Z) On the premises known as: 146 HARRISON BLVD. (basement 
apartment), red brick house with white trim, two car garage, 
located on the east side of HARRISON BLVD. 
( ) In the vehicle(s) described as: 
1—1966 Chev. Corvair, Utah plmte#618DDT 
2—1966 Chev. Corvair, Utah plate#VSB839 
3—1976 Toyota, Utah plate#582DKE 
4—1976 Ford Truck, Utah plate#0l9lCD 
5—1989 Chev., Utah plate#756DPJ 
6—not OB file, Utah platef553EAB,(brown Plymouth) 
In the City of OGDEN , County of WEBER 
State of Utah, there is now certain property or evidence described 
as: 
1—MARIJUANA, a green leafy substance in dried form* 
2—MATERIALS U8BD TO PACKAGE MARIJUANA, specifically, plastic 
sandwich bags* 
3—MATERIALS FOR U8IN0 MARIJUANA: 
a—cigarette papers, small sheets of flammable paper with 
adhesive on one side, 
b—pipes, used to smoke marijuana, 
c—roach clips, used to hold a marijuana cigarette while being 
smoked. 
4—PERSONAL NOTES, records of narcotic transactions, listing names, 
dates, amounts molds 
5—FRUITS OF NARCOTIC TRANSACTIONS, U.S. Currency, cash in various 
denominations» 
6—ALL HANDGUNS, RIFLES, AND OTHER WEAPONS THAT CAN PRODUCE BODILY 
INJURY. 
and that said property or evidence: 
(X) Was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed 
(X) Has been used, or is possessed with the purpose of 
being used to commit or conceal the commission of an 
offense 
(Z) Is evidence of illegal conduct 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT PAGE 2 
The facts establishing the grounds for issuance of a search warrant 
are: 
CI#2 oontaotad your affiant in April of 1990 and reported that Pat 
Barnas of 146 Harrison was selling pound quantities of Barijuana 
to Russell and Marianne Kadsen of 587 4th street. An investigation 
was initiated and on 3 May 1990 Agents of the Weber/Morgan 
Narcotics Strike Force executed a search warrant at 587 4th Street. 
Several controlled substances and iteas of drug paraphernalia were 
found inside the residence. Both subjects were arrested, charged 
and convicted on possession of Barijuana and drug paraphernalia 
charges. During your affiants investigation Patrick o. Barnes was 
observed arriving at the residence and departing a short time 
later. 
Your Affiant initiated an investigation in May 1990, after 
receiving information from a confidential source (CZ#1) that Pat and 
Raelene Barnes were selling Barijuana. 
CZfl was introduced to the suspects by Luanne Orvis, who is 
currently on probation for Distribution of Cocaine in Weber County. 
CZfl Bade a buy of one ounce of Barijuana from Raelene Barnes on 
11/20/90, under the control and surveillance of your affiant, at 
146 Harrison. CZfl reported observing Barijuana, weight scales, 
and Boney inside a safe located in the bedroom closet of the 
residence which is occupied by Patrick and Raelene Barnes. 
CZfl has also reported Luanne Orvis, Taai Vargo and Brett Thomas, 
are living in the basement apartment or 146 Harrison and are 
selling Barijuana supplied to them by Pat Barnes. Vargo and Thomas 
are pending charges in Weber County for possession of 
Bethamphetamine and distribution of cocaine. CZfl has purchased 
controlled substances from Vargo and Thomas under the control of 
your affiant. CZfl purchased one quarter ounce of Barijuana from 
Luanne Orvis on 11/27/90, under the control and supervision of 
strike Force Agents. 
Your affiant has observed the transportation of controlled 
substances inside the following vehicles during this investigation 
and-requests authorisation to search these vehicles: 
1—1966 Chev Corvalr, Utah plate f 6 is DDT 
2**1966 Chev Corvair, Utah plate fV8B839 
3—1976 Toyota, Utah plate fSS2DHB 
4—1976 Ford Truck, Utah plate foltlCD 
5—1989 Chev, Utah plate 6756DPJ 
6—not on file, Utah plate 6553EAB (brown Plymouth) 
Your affiant oonducted a criminal history Investigation of Patrick 
O. Barnes and Raelene Barnes. P.Barnes was oonvicted of a drug 
charge in 1971 and acquitted of a second charge in 1972. R.Barnes 
.} iU 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT PAGE 3 
showed no past criminal history. 
on 12/C/90, CKl raportad observing tha salas of controlled 
substancas inside tha rasidanca and tha suspacts smoking marijuana. 
Your affiant has baan a Police Officar for fiftaan yaars including 
fiva yaars as a Fadaral Polica Officar and fiva yaars as a Paace 
Officar amployad by tha South Ogdan Polica Dapartmant. Your 
Affiant has baan assignad as an investigator with tha Wabar/Morgan 
Narcotics Strika Forca sinca April 1990. Your affiant has 
complatad forty hours of training in Basic Narcotics Invastigation 
sponsorad by Utah P.O.8.T. and aighty hours of Narcotics 
Invastigation sponsorad by tha Drug Inforcamant Administration. 
Your affiant haa oonductad numarous narcotics invastigations and 
undarcovar drug purchases. 
Your Affiant baliavaa that tha named premises, and parson should 
be searched for drug paraphernalia. Affiant knows from experience 
and training that these items are almost always found on premises 
where narcotic search warrants have baan served. Your Affiant also 
knows that the auspect must keep such items on hand to test or to 
allow customers to use the substance being purchased. 
Your Affiant believes tha premises should be saarchad for records 
of narcotics aales and rasidency papers. Your affiant knows from 
past execution of numerous search warrants that suspects often keep 
such records to show amounts purchased, dates of purchases, who 
purchased, and especially drug indebtedness. 
Your affiant baliavaa that tha named premises should ba saarchad 
for packaging material. Suspects selling Marijuana hava to package 
the drug from larger quantities to ba sold. Further, your Affiant 
balieves that tha premises is an ongoing oparation, and these items 
would be on hand for tha purpose of sailing tha substance. 
Your Affiant prays for a night tima service as vail as no-knock 
service of the warrant. Your Affiant knows from experience and 
training that more and more narcotics dealers are arming themselves 
for protection against one another as wall as from narcotics users. 
Your Affiant has baan on numerous narcotic search warrants where 
firearms are available to suspects insida the premises. Further, 
your affiant believes it is safer for tha officers serving the 
warrant as well as non-participants to tha narcotic salas, if the 
officars have tha covar of darkness as wall as no-knock service. 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT PAGE 4 
Your affiant considers the information received from the 
confidential informant reliable because: 
CI#l has provided information in three past narcotics 
investigations which have led to the arrest and conviction of seven 
offenders. Your affiant conducted a background investigation of 
the CI and verified personal information given by the CI. The CI 
has provided information about all of the subjects which was 
verified by your affiants investigation. The CI is not a narcotics 
user and is not pending any criminal charges. 
The following information corroborates the facts given by the 
confidential informant: 
The CI has provided names, addresses, and vehicle descriptions of 
the subjects which have been verified by your affiant. The CI has 
purchased controlled substances from the subjects on six separate 
dates within the past seven months with two of the buys within the 
past two weeks. 
Wherefore the affiant prays that a search warrant be issued for 
the seizure of said items: 
( ) In the daytime 
(X) At any time day or night because there is reason to 
believe it is necessary to seize the property prior to 
it being concealed, destroyed, damaged, altered or for 
other good reasons as follows: 
It is further requested that the officer executing the requested 
warrant not be required to give notice of his authority or purpose 
because: 
(X) The property sought may be quickly destroyed, disposed 
of or secreted. 
(X) Physical harm may result to any person if notice were 
given. 
This danger believes to exist because: 
yfr/frVLUXcj *Z*>lJ 
AFFIANT TITLI 
SUBSCRIBED AMD SHORN TO BEFORE KB THIS(J* DAY OF 
_JS_M: 
JUDGE 
04 J 
IM THE CIRCUIT COURT 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH 
SEARCH WARRANT 
TO ANY PEACE OPPICER IN THE STATE OP UTAH* 
Proof by affidavit under oath having been made this day before me 
by: WILLIAM WENTLAND , I am satisfied that there is probable 
cause to believe that: 
(Z) On the person(s) of: 
1—PATRICK O. BARNES 
2—RAELENE BARME8 
3—LUANNB ORVI8 
4—BRETT THOMAS 
5—TAMI VARGO 
6— ALL PERSON8 ON THE PREMISE8 OP 146 HARRI80N BLVD(basement 
apartment) 
(Z) On the premises known as: 14 6 HARRISON BLVD.(basement 
apartment) red brick house with white trim, two car garage, located 
ont eh east side of Harrison Blvd. 
(Z) In the vehicle(s) described as: 
1—1966 Chev Corvair, Utah plate #618DDT 
2—1966 Chev corvair, Utah plate <V8B839 
3—1976 Toyota, Utah plate <582DHE 
4—1976 Pord Truck, Utah plate #0191CD 
5—1989 Chev, Utah plate #7S6DPJ 
6—not on file, Utah plate <553EAB (brown Plymouth) 
In the city of OGDEN , County of WEBER 
State of Utah, there is not being possessed or concealed certain 
property or evidence described as: 
1—MARIJUANA, a green leafy substance in dried form. 
2—MATERIALS USED TO PACKAGE MARIJUANA, specifically, plastic 
sandwich bags. 
3—MATERIALS FOR USING MARIJUANA: 
a—cigarette papers, small sheets of flammable paper with 
adhesive on one side, 
b—pipes, used to smoke marijuana, 
e—roach elips, used to hold a marijuana cigarette while being 
smoked. 
4—PERSONAL NOTES, records of nareotie transactions, listing names, 
dates, and amounts sold. 
5—FRUITS OP NARCOTIC TRANSACTIONS, U.S. Currency, cash in various 
denominations. 
6—ALL HANDGUNS, RIFLES, AND OTHSR WEAPONS THAT CAN PRODUCE BODILY 
INJURY. 
CONTINUED 
Oij 
SEARCH WARRAMT PAGE 2 
Which property or evidence: 
(Z) Was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed 
(X) Has been used, or is possessed with the purpose of 
being used to commit or conceal the commission of an 
offense 
(Z) Is evidence of illegal conduct 
YOU ARZ THEREFORE COMMANDED 
( ) In the daytime 
(X) At any time, day or night 
(X) To execute without notice of authority or purpose 
To make a search of the above named or described person(s), 
premises and vehicle(s) for the herein above described property or 
evidence, and if you find the same, or any part thereof, to bring 
it forthwith before me at the CIRCUIT Court, County of WEBER 
State of Utah, or retain such property in your custody subject to 
the order of this court. 
GIVEN UNDER MY HAND AND DATED THIS **'~ DAY OF P/CPy^ 1 9 ^ 
JUDGE 
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MR. S U L L I V A N : THAT' 5 LEON. 
THE COURT.* LEON. YEAH, THE IMPLICATION OBVIOUSLY OF 
THAT, ORME IE SAYING THAT LEON IE GOOD LAW IN UTAH, BUT IT 
DOESN'T APPLY IN THIS PARTICULAR CASE BECAUSE Or THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES. I FIND IT KIND OF INTERESTING THAT JUDGE GAI'T! 
IN HIS CONCURRENCE SAYS THAT WE'RE GOING TO WAIT TO DETERMINE 
WHETHER OR NOT LEON IS THE LAW IN THE STATE OF UTAH. WE HA-T 
JUDGE JACKSON WHO DISSENTS WITH NO COMMENT. SO IT'S KIND Of 
HARD TO ?<NOW WHAT JUDGE JACKSON IS DISSENTING BASSE' UPO*-* Ar-il' 
IVJAYEC HE JUST DiON vT LIKE TKI WHOL.Z DAMN TH3NG. 1 DON-" 
KNOW, J CAN SYMPATHIZE WITi-i THAT. FRANK.LY. BW> THEY 
CERTAINLY LEAVE THE LEON ISSUE UP IN ~HF AIR. I DON'T AGREE 
WITH YOUR A N A L . Y S I S OF MY OELIGATIOr.. SEEMS TO ME THE COU;"•••" 
HAS AM OBLIGATION TO CALL IT THE WAY IT SEES IT. AND WHERE 
THE FEDERAL SUPREME COURT HAS RULED THAT AT LEAST WITH 
REFERENCE TO FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS THAT LEON APPLIES, 
I THINK I'M ENTITLED, IF I WISH, TO APPLY THE LEON DOCTPJNL. 
EVEN TO — E^'EN TO STATE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES BECAUSE I CAN'T 
REALLY SEE ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIVERGENCE IN THE LANGUAGE OF THE 
UTAH CONSTITUTION AND THE LANGUAGE OF THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION AS IT RELATES TO WARRANTS. SO I THINK THAT'S 
WITHIN MY PREROGATIVE IF I CHOOSE TO DO SO. WHETHER I DO SO 
OR NOT IS A DIFFERENT QUESTION ENTIRELY. 
CONCERNING THE NIGHTTIME, NO-KNOCK PROVISIONS, IT SEEMS 
TO ME THAT THE COURT HAS TWO THINGS UPON WHICH IT COULD BASE 
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ITS DEC If JON. THE INFORMATION CONTAINEE IN THE LAST ~ A M
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OF -'AGE TfiREL AND THE INFORMATION CONTAINED ON FOUR. -'NEE FOUR 
WHICH THE COURT HAG SOMEWHAT CRITICIZED BECAUSE IT" Z IN Ti-IM-
MATURE OF CONCLUSIONARY STATEMENTS, COUCHED IN TERMS QC THE 
STATUTE. AT ANY TIME DAY OR NOT BECAUSE THERE IS REASON TO 
BELIEVE IT IS NECESSARY TO SEIZE THE PROPERTY PRIOR TO IT 
BEING CONCEALED, DESTROYED, DAMAGED, ALTERED — I SUPPOSE THAT 
THAT IS SOMEWHAT CONCLUSIONARY, BUT ON THE OTHER HAND, WHEN 
YOU'RE DEALING WITH NARCOTICS. I THINr- THAT'S GENERALLY fHC 
CASE. AND IN FACT ALMOST ALWAYS IS THE CASE. AND FOR OTHER 
GOOD REASONS AS FOLLOWS. PROPERTY LETM: S C L , AS FOLLOW: • • 
WELL, IT DOESN'T SAY ANYTHING AFTER A'~- FOLLOWS, ALTHOUGH THAT 
MAY VE^Y WEL.L RELATE I ACR TO T :L L.AST PARAGRAPH 0«. PAGE-
THREE. 
NOW, ONCE AGAIN, T H E TERMS THAT ARE SOMEWHAT 
CONCLUSIONARY IN NATURE. YOU KNOW. THEV HAVE GUN!!, AND BECAUSE 
THEY HAVE GUNS, WE BEL. I EVE IT WOULD BE SAFER IF WE WENT IN AT 
NIGHT AS OPPOSED TO IN THE DAYTIME. WE'LL BE EOINC IN UNDER-
COVER OF DARKNESS AND SO ON. SOME OF IT'S CONCLUSIONARY, SOME 
OF IT IS SOMEWHAT FACTUAL, BUT IT SEEMS TO ME AS A RULE OF 
EVIDENCE, GENERALLY SPEAKING, IF YOU ESTABLISH THE EXPERTISE 
OF THE INDIVIDUAL, WHICH THEY'VE DONE IN PREVIOUS PARAGRAPHS. 
THAT EVEN AN AFFIDAVIT THEY SHOULD BE ENTITLED TO GIVE 
OPINIONS, AND THIS SEEMS TO ME TO BE IN THE NATURE OF AN 
OPINION. THAT IT WOULD BE SAFER TO DO IN AT NIGHT BOTH FOR 1 HE 
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OFFICERS' AND NONPARTICIPANTS. AND I INTERPRET T M A T ALTHOUGH 
IT'S SOMEWHAT AMBIGUOUS, IT COULD BE EITHER PEOr-,_E WHO A?-:E IN 
THE PREMISES OR MAY VERY WEuL BE NEIGHBORS AND SO FORTH. 
INNOCENT BYSTANDERS, THAI WOULD BE MORE L I K L L V THAN NOT OUT 
AND ABOUT AND SUBJECT TO BEING HURT AS A RESULT OF A GUN 
CONFRONTATION, SO FORTH. 
SO IT SEEMS TO MF\ IN SPITE OF JUDGE ROTH'S RULING, THAT 
THERE IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE, THERE IS SUFFICIENT INFORMATION 
ON THE FACE OF THE AFFIDAVIT THAT JUSTIFIES BOTH A NO-KNOCK 
PROVISION AND THE NIGHTTIME SEARCH. THOSE ARE THE ISSUES THAT 
HAVE BEEN PRESENTED TO ME FOR RESOLUTION. 
THE COURT BELIEVES BASED UPON THE COMMENTS THAT THT 
MOTION IS NOT WELL TAKEN, AND THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS IS 
DENIED. IS Ti^ lERE ANY PART OF WHAT YOU'VE TALKED ABOUT. MR. 
SULLIVAN, THAT WE HAVEN'T ADDRESSED'' OF IS THAT BASICALLY 
WHAT WE'RE TALKING ABOUT? 
MR. SUL.L.IVAN: I DEclCVE THAT'S BASICAL.LV WHAT WE'VE 
TALKED ABOUT, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: OKAY. NOW, WHERE ARE WE GOING FROM HERE" 
MP. SULLIVAN: BACK TO THE DRAWING BOARD. 
THE COURT: PARDON ME? 
MR. SULLIVAN: WE'LL START TALKING, GET THIS THING 
RESOLVED. 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. WHY DON'T WE — SO WE DON'T 
LOSE TRACK OF THIS, WHY DON'T WE PUT IT BACK ON THE MOTION 
: o 2. 
